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THE EUROPEAN AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITY, 1948-54
The proposals to form a Europear. Agricultural Community have 
been ignored by historians since they failed. There exists only one 
work on the subject, an unpublished thesis and two published 
articles which essentially are taken from that thesis (1). The 
author of this work, M. Gilbert Noël, did not have access to the 
Dutch, German and Italian materials which have been used here, nor 
does lie seem to have been able to use the same range of French 
materials. In addition his work is written from a somewhat 
different perspective than this paper. This neglect is hard to 
understand wher there has been so much speculative writing about 
the agreements which have now formed the basis of the European 
Economic Communities, especially when it is considered how 
inordinately large a share of the EC's time and money is taken up 
with the Common Agricultural Policy. There are times when 
agriculture seems the raison d'etre of the Community', yet the first 
attempt to regulate western European agriculture in. a common policy 
framework has been ignored, even though it contained many of the 
subsequent elements of the Common Agricultural Policy.
The origins of the proposals are to be found in two distinct
post-war developments. The fi rst is the clecisici. in the French
Ministry of Agriculture and in the Planning Commissariat to
generate export surpluses of primary products from the French
economy. The second lies in the failure of the OFFC trace
liberalization programmes to bring any advantages tc European 
agricultural exporters. Tbe attempts of the Netherlands tc rectify, 




























































































governments tc find markets; for the surpluses which they envisaged 
led to the attempts at a European-wide solution in the "Community" 
framework established by the Schuman proposals, attempts which came 
to complete failure. The reasons for this failure are considered at 
the end. To understand then, it is first necessary to consider in 
greater detail the origins of the idea and then to consider the 
attempts tc put it into practice.
THE ORIGINS OF THE GREEK POOL.
Until the bread shortages of late autumn and winter 1947 the 
Monnet Plan had concerned itself with the "modernisation" of French 
agriculture. Its activities in that direction had been largely 
irrelevant, insignificant ir. fact. Modernisation seemed something 
for the future when the reality was penury. Agriculture was not 
high on the Plan's list of priorities. It was not one of the "basic 
sectors" to which investment would be directed. Farmers followed 
prices, which were controlled only for grains and then mainly to 
keep the price down rather than tc increase output. In the 
uncontrolled animal farming sector output went up more steeply 
under the influence of high demand. It v.as the political response
to the catastrophic grair. harvest cf 1947, the worst of the
century, which changed everything. The political crisis was so
serious that for once agriculture moved to the forefront of
government policy-making. Pierre Pflimlin who became Minister of 
Agriculture and Feed Supply on 24 November 1947 had one obvious and 
immediate task, to increase domestic food supply by all means 




























































































for such a cause. Ir. January 1948 Pflimlir. was able to obtain a 
threefold increase in government credits, to the agricultural 
sector. Planning the expenditure cf these funds at first, started in 
the ill-equipped Ministry of Agriculture. When the Americans 
insisted in July 1948 that the European countries prepare a medium- 
term plan for economic recovery, however, planning for the 
agricultural sector moved into the Planning Commissariat which was 
not only better-equipped but had ir. any case to prepare for the 
OEEC the figures for the medium-term plan or. which the Americans 
were insisting.
The event that marked this change was the listing of 
agriculture as one of the six "basic sectors” of the economy into 
which the Plan's Investment Committee would channel funds, now 
including Marshall Aid funds. According to Pflimlin Monnet accepted 
this change once the great regional infrastructural inequalities in 
French agriculture were demonstrated to hir, particularly the 
relative backwardness of his own Charentes, and he was then able to 
envisage a higher level of expenditure directly on farms themselves 
as an aspect of France’s "ii.odemi satic.n" (?) . This is a wholly1 
plausible story, but there were other influences, probably ever 
more compelling, which led net only to this decision but also tc 
the radical changes in the way the Plan envisaged the post-war 
economy, of which this decision was but a part..
The most important was probably the acute dollar shortage. 
Until summer 1947 France, like all other west European countries 
had been able to assume that it was moving rapidly along the right 
path to a balance of payments equilibrium and that the dollar 




























































































expansion of 1946. These illusions had been shattered by the 
enormous increase ir. dollar imports j n 1947 and by spring 1948 
Marshall Aid had established a state of affairs where these dollar 
deficits would not need to be eliminated or paid off through a 
balance of payments equilibrium until 1952. One element in the 
deficits was dollar food imports; Korth America was the only food 
surplus area in the world. France was in the clear position that 
any food grown in France or in the overseas territories, no matter 
what its real cost compared to American food, was a saving in 
dollars. The planners thus had an obvious motive, as did all other 
west European governments, for increasing the output of 
domestically-produced food. The revision of the Plan in 1948 was 
concerned with using the agricultural sector to overcome France's 
balance-of-payments difficulties. The target now set was to feed 
France and the Saarland at a level of food consumption 15 per cent 
higher than before the war and yet at the same time to eliminate as 
far as possible dollar imports. It was envisaged that in future 
food imports would be largely confined to fats and tropical 
produce. For the first time since the 1860s France would cease to 
be on balance a feed importing country. Not only that, but the 
agricultural sector would now have to generate a sufficient volume 
of net agricultural exports to cover France's balance-of-payments 
deficits on commodity trade by the end of the Marshall Plan. This 
was a variable target of course, but by the end of December 1948 it 
was taken to mean that agricultural exports in 1952 should reach a 
level of $560 million! (3) linen the first official version of the 
Monnet Plan was published in 1946 it had been accepted that 




























































































resulted in occasional commodity surpluses the problem of disposal 
was simple, "they voulu serve to combat malnutrition in North 
Africa" (4).
If we ask why, instead of being content vith a target which 
sought to. eliminate dollar food imports the Monnet Plan reversed 
all its original assumptions and planned for n future in which 
France would be a net food exporter, we cannot, however, accept 
that the change was concerned solely with Trance's balance of 
payments position. It is also apparent that Monnet was accepting a 
set of political realities which he had chosen to ignore in 1945.
Earlier versions of the Plan seen to have relied on the idea 
that a rapid improvement in the agricultural sector would he 
induced simply by pouring out a stream of tractors (French 
tractors) and by a rapid redistr ihvttic.n of the pattern of 
landholding. By 1948 this looked politically naive. The first post­
war Minister of Agriculture, Tanguv-Prigent, himself a 
"moderniser", had created the Confédération Générale d'Agriculture 
(CGA) to replace the former Vichy Corporation Pay*sar.ne as an 
instrument cf government policy to help in this modernisation 
process (5). The CGA was supposed to serve as the highest, federal, 
policy-making structure cf a series of derxoraticrlly’-elected, 
agricultural syndicats for producers, cooperatives, technicians and 
so on. Of these the producers' synoicat, the Fédération Nationale* 
des Syndicats d'Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA), would obviously be 
the most important, and here the troubles for government policy 
began, for tire peasant vote and peasant support which had once gone 
to the Vichy regime did not support Tar.guy-Priger.t or the CGA. The 




























































































impose some sort of Soviet-style reform from above on French 
agriculture. When the voting for the syndicats took place the 
representatives returned to the FNSEA were men whose spiritual 
allegiance remained firmly with the Corporation Paysanne and "La 
France éternelle" and who displayed a deep suspicion of any process 
of improving productivity by reducing the agricultural labour 
force, realigning farms, or subjecting the sector to any 
governmental intervention ir, its workings outside the area of 
prices and stocks.
Pflimlin was able to bridge the political gap, most obviously 
because of the great increase in public money poured into 
agriculture; 4.5 per cent of total public investment in 1947, 7.5 
per cent in 1949 (6). It was also under Pflimlin that French 
agriculture moved progressively towards the system, widespread 
elsewhere in Europe, of public, guaranteed prices for a range of 
"key" crops which guaranteed farmers' incomes against the risks of 
over-production, at least ir. the arable sector. Pflimlin had to 
react to the political power of the agricultural vote and secure it 
for the centre through a complicated compromise between 
agricultural modernisation and public subsidies for farmers, while 
increasing output. Because livestock and dairy product prices had 
been left free, high demand, in a situation of very restricted 
supply, brought higher profits tc, farmers in that sector than any 
other. When animal farming prices collapsed in 1951 as a result of 
the improvement in supply, the general election of June 1951 
returned about 60 deputies with official backing from the new 
syndicats ■ Of these 27 were actually officials of the FNSEA. The




























































































deputies in its ranks (7). pflimlin's tenure at the Ministry cf 
Agriculture carte to an end and from July 1951 onwards the minister 
always came from the loose parliamentary alliance of the FNSKA 
deputies and the other peasant-bloc members cf the Assembly, the 
Amicale Parlamentaire A.gricole. After Pflimlin's successor, Paul 
Antier, haa resigned in protest over tie increases in public 
expenditure occasioned by the rearmament programme, the next 
minister was Camille Laurens, described by the Cer.eral Secretary of 
the CGA tc the Dutch agricultural attache in Paris as "a cattle- 
merchant, but not stupid" (8). Laurens had actually been an elected 
official of the Corporation Pavsanne.
That it was these inescapable political realities that Mrnnet 
was accepting when the Plan was revised appears most clearly from 
the revised Plan's ambiguity on the subject of the size cf the 
agricultural labour force. The Commissariat now argued that 
although in the long run improved productivity for French 
agriculture was the real goal, as it was for every other sector of 
the economy, and that eventually labour must be released, ir. the 
short run the present labour force must be retained tc achieve the 
higher output figures. It would be preserved ir, its present size 
until the end of 1952. Even when the second national plan was 
drafted in 1952 it was based on the publicly-stated assumption that 
employment in the agricultural sector would decline only slowly. In 
reality, however, the less of labour tc other sectors was high from 
1945 onwards, not surprisingly in a period of absolute full 
employment. About 110,000 workers left the agricultural sector 
annually ever the period 1945/9 and about 130,000 annually over the 




























































































mere labour on the land than was actually retained. The reason must 
be that exports had in fact become more important than 
productivity. This was not only because of their importance to the 
balance of payments position but because export increases, given 
the political balance of power, were easier to obtain than 
productivity increases, while being at the same time a target which 
could be presented as an immediate economic advantage. In the 
second national plan it was proclaimed that a further increase in 
exports was the only way of sustaining a further increase in 
productivity. This idea had already been present by' 194S and was 
formulated by Libert Bou, mainly responsible for drafting the 
agricultural sections of the Plan. He held that exports were 
essential, "because it is a fact attested by history that there can- 
only be true progress in agriculture ir. countries orientated 
towards the export market." (10). "No other western European 
country", he wrote, "has the same possibilities as France tc effect 
the technical revolution which would allow it to satisfy Europe's 
food needs. She*, has effectively only so far realized in the elite 
farming sector the fundamental transformation which in the last 
fifty or a hundred, years has allowed certain countries to take the 
lead in agricultural development." (11) The argument that exporting 
would force French agriculture to higher levels of productivity 
through the influence of international competition was completely 
bogus given the uncompetitive nature of western Europe's intra­
trade in agricultural products and reveals once more the cosmetic 
covering up of the fact that centrist governments could not live 
without support from the agricultural sector and that the only 




























































































improve productivity in this less promising framework. Agricultural 
exports thus came to have an inherent role in the French political 
process independent of their economic value in covering balance of 
payments deficits.
But what should be exported? Any attempt to answer this 
question from the historical evidence shows that exports were not 
selected because of their export potential but because certain 
commodities were being produced at home in excess cf present and 
future consumption. The lists of commodities envisaged as future 
exports and the quantities which it was thought could be absorbed 
by foreign markets vary from, one estimate to another to suit the 
changing circumstances of the French economy. Only wheat appears as 
a consistent factor and even there the quantity estin.ates r.f future 
exports had little in common with the production increases actually 
achieved. Table 1 shows the changes in the public planning targets 
for agricultural output as they' evolved over the period from the 
hesitant beginnings cf the first national plan to the revision of 
the second national plan in 1954, the date when it was finally' 
accepted. Apart from; wine plans were for a constantly rising output 
trend. In three areas of output in particular, wheat, sugar and 
dairy products, the revisio.r. of agricultural targets wont well 
beyond self-sufficiency. The import needs r.f other west European 
countries for these products, as presented in the OEEC medium-term 
plan, were large enough, it was considered, to "guarantee French 
farmers against the risk cf bad prices" and to "liberate them from 
all fear of over-production" (12).
But what the public planning calculations did not so clearly 




























































































prices free. Pierre flaestracci , Pflimlin's chef de cabinet, 
insisted that the planners also incorporate intc the OEEC figures a 
plan for exporting meat (13). In 194P when the problem was first 
approached statistically the plan was to export 1.5 m tonnes of 
wheat by 1952, not, it v:as suggested, a difficult target if account 
were taken "of the needs of the countries of central Europe, needs 
actually unsatisfied because of the growth of the population of 
these countries, the increase in their standard of living and, 
equally, of the difficulties which these populations have of 
acquiring in the dollar zone the foodstuffs which they need." (14) 
Applying the same criterion, the forecast import need of other west 
European countries, to meat exports, led to the assumption that 
exports of 200,000 tonnes of meat in one form or another were 
possible (15). The third possibility was dairy products. This was 
more difficult, especially if butter was chosen, because it led to 
direct competition on the British market with Danish and extra- 
European exporters, who had a firm and well-established grip on the 
market. What was left from their share of the British market was 
fought for by the Netherlands, Ireland and Switzerland. The German 
market was dominated by Dutch and Swiss imports, with Denmark 
taking the rest. To avoid this competition, it was argued, France 
should aim for cheese and powdered milk exports. Jn soft cheeses 
the competition was less strong, and although the United States 
dominated the European pow’dered milk market this might, as in the 
case of wheat, be France's opportunity to replace dollar imports in 
other western European countries. "It suffices to say that markets 
exist and that the rest will be a function of the aptitude of the 




























































































market and what wil 1 net be realizable in 1952 certainly will
become so later" (16) . Wheat exports would therefore go mainly to
Germany , meat exports tc Germany and the United Kingdom, cheese
could 90 to several different markets and powdered milk to Germany.
The long-run importances of the German market to these plans was
)
inescapable. By contrast, Italy, with which country negotiations 
were still in progress to form a customs union, appeared as being 
of no use whatsoever.
Monnet'e first idea was that these exports would be achieved 
through long-term bilateral export contracts. The French government 
would sign contracts guaranteeing delivery. The representative 
interest groups for agriculture in France and in the importing 
country would sign corresponding co.ritracts stipulating prices,
arranging for the administration of stockpiling programmes to
prevent too great a range of price fluctuations, and guaranteeing, 
through their influence on their own members, that there would be 
no further protectionism barriers erected to this trade. Within 
France the syndicats would thus bind themselves to the government 
to produce and export the necessary quantities (17). In this way 
Monnet could have achieved several objectives. Firstly he could 
have turned the new post-war representative structure for French 
agriculture into an instrument cf the Plan, its executive in fact. 
Secondly, he could have used those groups tc- link with their
European counterparts, thus capitalising on their post-war
political strength while extending the mechanisms of indicative 
planning onto the European level (18). Thirdly, he could then hope 
to create at that level a European-wide interest-group, structure. 




























































































coal and steel industries and would underpin a future European 
Agricultural Community once the Schumar. Plan negotiations had 
actually set up the High Authority, which he began to envisage also 
as directing an Agricultural Community (19).
To support these ideas the Planning Commissariat drew up a 
detailed plan of exactly what these contracts might cover to the 
end of 1952 (20). Once the commodities had been specified and the 
inter-governmental trade contracts passed down to the 
representative interest groups for executive action, it would then 
be the task of the Planning Commissariat to provide the investment 
necessary to enable France to compete in standard-quality exports 
of cheese, meat-products, powdered milk and, if necessary, even 
butter. Wheat, of course, was less of a problem in this respect. 
The markets that counted in these plans v.;ere the United Kingdom and 
Germany, not surprisingly since they were responsible for about 
two-thirds of Europe's food imports between them, with some help 
from a market vaguely classified by Monnet as "Benelux". Monnet's 
first idea for a wheat market, and Pflimlir.'s tcc, was not in fact 
Germany but the United Kingdom, almost certainly because of the 
importance of the United Kingdom, alliance to French plans for 
European reconstruction and also, no doubt, because the United 
Kingdom had a government. He envisaged sales contracts which would 
commit the United Kingdom to the purchase of 800,000 tonnes of 
French wheat by 1952, 1.4 million hectolitres of condensed milk, 
30,000 tonnes of frozen beef, 25,000 tonnes of charcuterie, 13,000 
tonnes of butter, 9,000 tonnes of cheese and 5,000 tcnnes of beef 
or veal carcasses. All this represented more than a half of the 




























































































tenuous held on foreign realities of Monnet; the British had no 
intention of committing themselves to long-term purchasing 
contracts for expensive French food exports when their economic 
policy was geared to the consumption of low-cost ford imports 
either from the Sterling Area or, if needs he, the dollar zone. 
They were prepared to contract only for the very first step in all 
this, the 100,000 tonnes of wheat which were envisaged as starting 
France's career as a wheat exporter in 1949. They did not, in any 
case, believe that France V’culd actually produce a wheat surplus 
(21) .
That left Germany arid "Benelux". By 1952 the Federal Republic, 
once it had been created, was envisaged as importing from France 
300,000 tonnes of wheat, 15,000 tonnes of live pigs, 10,000 tonnes 
of live cattle, 5,000 tonnes of beef carcasses, 4,000 tonnes of 
butter, 3,000 tcnr.es of cheese and half a million hectolitres of 
condensed milk. Exports of dairy products to "Benelux" w’ould be 
similar in size and tc those would be added 50,000 tonnes of wheat 
and 25,000 tonnes of meat ir. various forms.
When the International Wheat Agreement was signed in March 
1949 France demanded tc be ircluded as one cf the five exporters 
for whom 37 importers would provide quotas. The preamble tr the 
early drafts cf the second national plan in 1952 proclaimed the 
export of three "staples", wheat, dairj products and sugar as the 
basis of future policy. The plan forecast annual export surpluses 
by 1958 of two million tonnes of wheat, 20 million hectolitres, of 
milk and milk products in milk equivalent, 250,000 tonnes of sugar 
and 200,000 tonnes of meat (22). The CCA put these plans in 




























































































union with Italy, telling the minister that there was now "only one 
solution: the. opening up to France of another regulated market 
which imported foodstuffs, namely Germany" (23).
There were only three net agricultural exporters in western 
Europe; the Irish Republic, whose exports went almost entirely to 
the United Kingdom and which showed at that time no interest at all 
in these issues, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Denmark and the 
Netherlands suffered badly from the trade liberalization programme 
in OEEC in 1949/50, removing quotas on industrial imports while the 
other OEEC members retained their quotas against Danish and Dutch 
agricultural exports. Danish and Dutch interests were not, how'ever, 
identical. The mix of Dutch agricultural exports was much wider 
than that of Danish, r.ggs and fruit each amounted to about a tenth 
of total agricultural exports and potatoes tc even more. Butter and 
dairy products made up a greater proportion. Denmark, however, 
whose agricultural exports amounted tc almost three-quarters the 
total value of exports, depended on three staple exports, butter, 
meat and eggs. Furthermore, Denmark’s food processing industries 
depended ultimately on fodder imports on a large scale, amounting
to about one-■third of total imports. Danish agricultural activity
was thus on a much higher level of specialisation. The Netherlands
had far rao re possible bargaining positions open. Where Dutch and
Danish agricultural exports were directly competitive, as in the 
case of butter and eggs, in the completely free market tc which the 
OEEC trade liberalization programmes were hypothetically directed 
Denmark would have had decisive competitive advantages. Both 
countries had been prisoners in the 1930s of the monopsonistic 




























































































wished to escape from that situation in the post-war world. For 
both, as for France, the German market appeared to be of decisive 
future importance. Put whereas Denmark's national interest might 
best be served by getting as near as possible to; a totally free 
market the Netherlands could hope tc maximise its cwn national 
interest by constructing a more restrictive set of trading 
agreements, reducing protection against the products which the 
Netherlands specifically wished to export, while protecting Dutch 
agriculture ir, other sectors against its competitors, including 
Denmark.
For the Netherlands the problem of agricultural experts had 
primarily, however, tc be seen it. the wider context of all exports. 
More than forty per cent of butch national income care from foreign 
trade in goods and services ar.d this had been a historical reality 
for so long that tlie reduction of barriers to the free flow of 
goods and services in western Europe was inescapably a cardinal 
point in Dutch foreign policy. Dutch tariffs were low, s.o the 
removal of cpuo.tas through the trade 1iberalizatirm programmes had 
an immediate impact r.n reducing the level of protection in the 
post-war Netherlands. Similar processes in high-tariff countries 
did not help Dutch experts because tariffs, were exempt from the 
OEEC trade liberalization programmes. Agricultural trade remained 
virtually unaffected by these prcgramrr.es because of the high level 
of agricultural protectionism everywhere. It was this dangerous, 
situation which produced in the 1950s a series, of Dutch foreign 
policy initiatives aimed at reducing barriers to the movement of 
goods and services in intra-west-European trade. The Stikker "Plan 




























































































plans for joint tariff reductions, mutual preference extension, and 
the "Beyen Plan" as it came to be called for a West European common 
market as part of the proposed European Political Community, were 
all attempts tc solve the same problem. As the trade liberalization 
programmes had already shown, however, agricultural trade was an 
altogether different affair from trade in manufactures because of 
the deep and intimate involvement of governments in managing the 
agricultural sector. Effectively, each national agricultural sector 
was managed like a huge state corporation and would never be 
subject to the economic rules and practices which governed private 
trade, no matter how far western Europe returned in other sectors 
to private trade in a multilateral framework. Any attempt by the 
Netherlands to pursue its policy of reducing barriers on the 
European frontiers immediately confronted this particular problem 
of the agricultural sector, not least because agriculture was so 
important to the Netherlands itself and because it was managed 
there in the same way as elsewhere.
The Stikker Plan, the "Plan of Action" as it was called in the 
OEEC where it was presented in June 1950, was not in its origins 
concerned with agriculture. It proposed that a process of "sectoral 
integration" be attempted in the west European economies by means 
of separate negotiations at the OEEC level on each commodity for 
which it was proposed to "integrate" the market in the trade 
liberalization programmes. Stikker was a liberal and the whole 
intention of his proposals, which were excessively vague, was tc 
reduce tariffs and quotas at the same time, thereby going well 
beyond the limited objectives of the OEEC trade liberalization 




























































































agriculture was that it required "a special treatment" (24). This 
was enough, however, to generate a burst of activity inside the 
Ministry of Agriculture which resulted in a comprehensive plan for 
the control of western European agriculture drawn up by the 
minister, Sicco Mansholt, and his top officials. In its essentials 
this plan resembled in many ways the eventual Ccnmon Agricultural 
Policy cf the European Community, of which Mansholt became of 
course himself eventually a founding father. Pis chief aide in the 
ministry in drawing up these proposals, S.L. Louwes, was actually 
the brother of the head of the central interest-group organisation 
for Dutch agriculture, the Stichting veor de Landbouw.
Mansholt's plan was presented to the Dutch cabinet in August 
1950. Its basic idea was that western Europe should develop a 
common agricultural impcrt and export policy and that in the 
western European agricultural markets there should be common 
producer prices to which all countries should move over a specified 
transitional period. A common Integration Fund v;ould subsidise 
sectors unable to obtain these prices. These complicated price 
regulations together with the control of a common externa] tariff 
and foreign trade policy fer west European agriculture would be 
administered by a "European Beard for Agriculture and Food". It 
would take control of grain, meat, end dairy products as a minimum 
and might then add to its empire wir.e, eggs, fats and oils, and 
even tobacco. In a later version before the plan vent te cabinet it 
was envisaged that there would be a central control of western 
European fodder imports. All this, of course, was close to Kcrnet's 




























































































fundamentally different to what Stikker, and indeed the more left- 
wing members, of the Dutch government, wanted to see. Even 
Epierenburg, who had committed himself to the ECSC, advised 
ministers against the Manshclt proposals. His argument, which has 
subsequently been proved correct, was that Dutch domestic prices 
would be forced upwards while the central authority would find 
itself trying to dispose of unwanted surpluses at prices lower than 
those on domestic markets, while also becoming increasingly 
interventionist and imposing production quotas (25).
On these grounds the government rejected the proposals in 
August for further consideration in September. When they were 
presented once more, however, Mansholt had not been deflected. The 
proposals now envisaged the possibility of countries maintaining 
domestic prices below the official producer prices, but not of 
using these lower prices in foreign trade. This concession was 
intended only to be temporary. Like the French planners Mansholt 
resorted to the argument that "planning” cf this kind would speed 
up the rate of productivity improvement so that prices were bound 
to fall in the long run. The government was rot convinced and 
Stikker, whose "Plan of Action" had already lost all impetus, 
demanded that its preamble now contain the phrase that "real 
integration in agriculture was not possible""! (26) Faced with this 
opposition Mansholt decided that the transitional arrangements to 
common European prices wculu last so long as to be almost 
permanent, but that there was still the possibility for the 
introduction almost at once of a common market in wheat and sugar. 
This was acceptable, and the Mansholt proposals in this much 




























































































Mansholt placed a great deal of faith in the supranational 
element in his proposals since he saw thin as the only way of 
overcoming the rules of unanimity and veto which he considered had 
blocked all progress towards a solution in the OEEC. He never 
appears to have envisaged that the United Kingdom, would be 
included. Here, too, he was leaning towards Mcnnet's side, for 
after the rejection by the United Kingdom of Monnet's idea of long­
term Francc-British trade contracts Rennet was always prepared, at 
times eager, for an Agricultural Community which omitted the United 
Kingdom.. Stikker was strongly opposed to any such action, with the 
consequence that the Kanshclt proposals were only accepted as 
guidelines fer the conduct of negotiations within the OEEC in the 
context of Stikker's "Plan". Nevertheless, in their various phases 
and disguises they were to haunt all European agricultural 
discussions until the eventual development of the Common 
Agricultural Policy.
THE, SEARCH FOE AN INTERNATIONAL AC F, ELUENT
The French centre parties, including the KPP of which Pflimlin 
was a member, contained a certain number of advocates of a Franco- 
German association in some kind of European framework as a solution 
to France’s national security problem. Once Germany was identified 
as the best, perhaps the only possible, cutlet for the planned 
agricultural surpluses the party began to toy with including 
agriculture in their proposals fer a "European solution". At the 




























































































1949 the MRP group requested a study of ways cf facilitating intra- 
west-European agricultural trade. In September Pflimlin personally 
protested strongly against the way in which the French government, 
following the example of others, had emitted most German industrial 
goods from the lists drawn up for negotiations in OEEC on trade 
liberalization. Without some change cf policy, he argued, there was 
no hope of persuading Germany to remove quotas on French 
agricultural exports.
The first Franco-German bilateral trade agreement did make 
provision for French wheat exports to Germany, but this was only 
for one year and wheat was only part of the problem. Sc far was 
French output from reaching the targets set, even for output for 
domestic consumption, that it might have been thought there was 
little pressure to look for any more complex framework than the 
renewal and widening of this bilateral agreement. But by the end of 
Kay 1950 the situation had changed in a fundamental way; the 
agreement on a European Payments union had rung the death-knell of 
bilateral trade between western European countries and Schuman had 
made his proposals for the Coal, Iron and Steel Community. In any 
case it is clear that Pflimlin and Mornet were always interested in 
a mere far-reaching political solution to the problem of Franco- 
German relations. Pflimlin wrote to Mor.net at the end cf May 1950 
congratulating him on the early success of the Schuman proposals 
and adding, "Perhaps you remember certain conversations where we 
discovered the coincidence cf our views, cri this problem as or. so 
many others". (28) This was the prelude to an attempt to persuade 
Monnet to link the concept of an Agricultural Community to the Coal 




























































































Pf Hailin'e deputy, specifically asVed Mor.net to do so and to raise 
the issue at an opportune moment in the Schuman Plan negotiations. 
French agricultural experts tc Germany "can only find an effective 
solution in the progressive realisation of an economic union which 
releases the reciprocal commerce of the two countries from the 
vicissitudes of industrial or agricultural protectionism - from 
bilateralism ana from financial disequilibrium" (29).
Mcnnet, and here the documentary record confirms his memoirs, 
did everything lie could to forestall any such official discussions 
until the Coal and Steel Community negotiations- were safely 
concluded and also to make sure that the Agricultural Community 
which Pflimlin had in mind would be restricted to "the Six", would 
be governed by a High Authority which could be assimilated to: that 
for the Coal and Steel Community arid which would have the same 
interventionist powers, and would share with the Coal and Steel 
Community the Court of Justice and the Assembly (30). He succeeded 
in postponing Pflimlin's intention to submit proposals for ar. 
Agricultural Community tc, the French Council of Ministers until 
September (31). At that meeting ministers vent ric further than 
setting up four working groups to study the four commodities which 
would be most in quest.jor . These were the three "staples", 
together, now, with wine.
French interest in wine exports was of a fundamentally 
different nature from that in the "staples". This was the one 
commodity whose output was planned to fall. Side by side with this 
reduction the Ministry of Agriculture wanted to negotiate sore 
guarantee for high-value experts, because the intention was to 




























































































encouraging exports of the traditional high-value luxury products. 
A European Agricultural Community, however, would link France to a 
wine producer cn the same large scale, Italy, whose quality 
controls were primitive compared to those which governed French 
high-value wines, whose prices were lower, and whose main output 
was cheap table wines. Hew could French lov.— value producers be 
protected against Italian imports while their total output was also 
being shrunk by government policy, and hew cculd French high-value 
exporters be protected against competition from Italian exporters 
not subjected to the same quality controls? Here, a solution might 
be found in a European context, perhaps by forcing Italy to align 
with common Franco-German quality controls.
Interestingly, neat had new disappeared again from official 
consideration in spite of the attention given to it in the Plan in 
1948. It had been replaced by sugar. It could be argued that one
reason for this was that sugar was an expert requiring less
investment than meat. But it is much more probable that the
commitment to sugar a s a staple export came from other
circumstances. French sugar producers ir. the 1930s had received a 
form of direct government support which had not subsequently been 
withdrawn. Sugar surplus to requirements was up> to a certain 
quantity purchased by the government ar.d converted into alcohol, 
which was then sold to industrial firms at a loss to the central 
government. To this the Planning Commissariat was always strongly 
opposed. Mo target was set for sugar output in the 1946 versions of 
the Mcnnet Plan while the planners embarked on a long argument with 
central government over the fiscal implications of their policy. 




























































































the National Assembly. Only after Pflirolin had become Minister of 
Agriculture was a sugar output target set. It. represented an 
increase of two-thirds on the pre-war level of output and it seems 
probable that the reward to beet procurers for removing their 
direct facility for offloading their surpluses onto the government 
was the official commitment to find a European export market, for 
their even bigger surpluses.
The "working groups" had concluded by January 1951 and on 12 
February, well before the first High Authority was safely 
negotiated, Pflimlin sought permission once tore to translate his 
plans into diplomatic action by an official invitation to the other 
powers to a European conference. By this time, however, the idea of 
a European Agricultural Community, which Monnet had excluded from 
the Schur.ian Plan negotiations and which had never emerged from the 
Council of Ministers as an official diplomatic initiative, had 
already entered the level of international diplomatic negotiation. 
Pflimlir. seems at first to have been unaware of the Dutch 
discussions. Monr.et had wanted the idea to be sprung on the world 
without prior negotiation, other than the discussions within the 
Consultative Assembly, as a second step in the making of "Europe". 
He envisaged an initial proposal from, the French government based 
on a "document ue travail", akin to that presented in the Schumnn 
Plan negotiations, which could serve as the basis of a treaty. In 
accepting the "document de travail" all the other powers would hind 
themselves to the eventual acceptance of the surrender of some 
further degree of their national sovereignty, this, time ever their 
agricultural policies, to a High Authority (32). But by postponing 




























































































Mcnnet achieved only the opposite result. By February 1951 when 
Pflimlin was still seeking permission from the French government tc 
launch an initiative similar to this, semi-official discussions 
with both the Germans and the Dutch had already taken place and 
what had been discovered in these negotiations had already gone a 
long way to make Monnet's conceptions appear hopelessly simplified.
Given the political impulse in the Netherlands it would have 
been absurd for Pflimlin to have done nothing and in any case the 
planners were still insisting that 1952 was the year by which 
France needed markets. The crux of the matter was the German 
market. Because no official approach could be made to the Germans 
an approach was made at the interest group level through the CGA 
directly to its German counterpart organisation, the Deutscher 
Bauernverband. At the International Conference of Agricultural 
Producers, which had been created in 1948 as a central forum fcr 
the various quasi-cfficiai interest-group organisations which had 
themselves been recreated after the war on a national basis, the 
CCA and the Bauernverband agreed to form a "permanent committee" 
which would meet a month later, on 3/4 July' in Paris, tc sign "a 
charter of permanent cooperation”. Beneath this stirring phrase, 
however, the reality was very different. The Bauernverband's 
internal coherence depended on its support for high levels of 
protection for German agriculture. It was perfectly ready to reach 
agreement on longer-term purchasing contracts for French wheat 
surpluses. That after all was a way/ of keeping up grain prices in 
Germany when the Ministry of the Economy wanted tc buy' wheat in the 
cheapest markets and bring the price down. But the only other thing 




























































































officially request their governments to call a "European wire 
conference" to standardise, legislation on quality controls (33). 
Philippe Lair.cur, the Secretary Genera] of the CCA, described the 
leader of the Bauernverbai.d, Andreas Hermes, as being "cool" to the 
French ideas and more interested in signing agreements with Italy, 
whose agricultural exports were net sc competitivo with those of 
German farmers (34).
This did nothing to reconcile 3ta]y tc the affair. The 
discussions between the CGA and its Italian namesake, the 
Confederazione Generalo dell'Agricoltura, had taken up no small 
part of the time of the technical committees which had been 
discussing the implementation cf the Franco-Italian customs union. 
French agriculture had been strongly opposed to that union and was 
now busy discussing privileged entry for its own products into 
Italy's main market. Monnet's original revisions cf the Plan in 
1948 envisaged Italy as a market able to take at the most 150,000 
tonnes of French wheat in 1952. By' the close of the harvest year 
1952/3 Italy, however, was committed under the International Wheat 
Agreement to take imports up to 1.1 million tonnes from Agreement 
countries. The Italian government certainly envisaged the 
possibility of a larger quantity of wheat imports from France. As 
Italy maintained a 55% ad valorem tariff on wheat imports, in any 
customs union with France the degree of preference which French
exporters would have on the Italian market would therefore be
greater. I taly had been rejected primarily for two reasons. It
offered little scope for experts other than wheat. But, me re
decisively, French farmers were net prepared to tolerate ir, their 




























































































which a customs union would have entailed. The Quai d'Orsay 
insisted that the Italians be present at the Franco-German 
negotiations in Paris in July as a return for Italian support in 
the Schuman Plan negotiations, but the French CCA simply refused to 
pass on the invitation (35).
It had already become obvious by July that the organized 
representatives of agriculture did not necessarily share identical 
views on the nature of an Agricultural Community with their 
governments and the situation was the more complicated in France 
where the CGA was closer to government policy than the FI.’SEA where 
the real political power of voters was concentrated. We may imagine 
what the outcome of the Schuman Plan negotiations v’ould have been 
had the French government used the French steel manufacturers' 
association in this way to conduct the preliminary stage of its 
negotiations, and also, no doubt, what the German response would 
have been at the same level. The Bauernverband had offered no hone 
of a long-term market in Germany for French sugar, dairy products 
or wine and any last vestiges of goodwill on the Italian side had 
been destroyed (36). Meanwhile at government level the Germans 
could insist that the whole affair was private and had no official 
status of any kind. Although this argument could also be used 
inside the German government to stifle the cries of pretest from 
Minister Erhard, the discovery of these negotiations by the 
Ministry for the Economy only stiffened its resolution to oppose 
any such Franco-German agreement as being a prop to protectionist 
interests inside the Federal Republic (37).
The success of any common European policy to support the 




























































































Agriculture now seemed to depend on coming to terras with the 
position taken by Dutch agriculture. Kansholt had already 
threatened the Dutch cabinet in August with the news that the 
French were coming forward with a plan, too (3P). Frcr. September 
onwards the Dutch agricultural attaché in Paris, was kept reasonably 
well informed cf the internal struggles in the French government 
while Pflimlin and his ministerial colleagues tried to bring the 
Dutch in on their side. Success in this direction might still force 
the Germans to a more cooperative attitude. On 6 November 1950 
officials of the French and Dutch ministries r.f agriculture met in 
Paris and discussed the feasibility of a central supranational 
regime for imports and the possibility cf establishing a central 
investment fund, financed from the income which the "Furopear, 
Board" would receive from the common external tariff, to help 
investment in more backward agricultural regions. Here, the 
differences became obvious between the ambitious schemes cf 
Manshc.lt and Pflimilin's altogether more pragmatic approach. 
Mansholt wanted the transitici.al measures to he brought 
straightaway under the control and approval of the supranational 
authority; the French were more inclined to leave the matter to 
national governments and only tc diminish national authority over 
agriculture enee "competitive conditions" had been established. The 
concept of the central investment fund had not yet even been 
discussed in the French Council of Ministers (39). Pflimlin, in 
whose own constituency a large number of dairy farmers were 
represented, was apprehensive about the control of milk prices by a 
"European Board". The Planning Commissariat felt that the milk 




























































































case there would have to be a "High Authority" to regulate the 
competing Danish and Dutch surpluses. If sugar were included a 
"High Authority" was inevitable to control imports and regulate the 
export surpluses, because many western European countries were not 
only sugar producers on a large scale but had commitments also to 
take extra-European imports. Butter surpluses, likewise, were 
unmanageable without a "High Authority", because both France and 
the Netherlands were going to be butter exporters to Germany (40).
These Franco-Dutch discussions were followed closely in Italy, 
often through the good offices of the Deutscher Bauernverband which 
feared perhaps a European attack. Before Pflimlin had drawn up his 
draft invitation to the European conference the Italian Ministry of 
Agriculture had already firmly decided against any attempt at a 
European common market. Italian prices cn average were lower than 
elsewhere in western Europe, so all fixed "European" prices would 
discriminate against Italian exports. Even if Italy, for political 
and diplomatic reasons, were forced into negotiations on an 
Agricultural Community these would have to cover a whole range of 
products which the Dutch and the French were not even talking 
about. Officials enjoyed themselves listing these; fruit, rice, 
perfume essences, tobacco, fresh vegetables, the list grew ever 
larger. Stepping cut of the customs union was not going to help the 
French avoid the issue c.f Italian experts. From other ministries 
came the demand, as usual, that a common market would have to 
provide for free labour migration as well (although it was quite 
clear that the other members were trying to get rid of surplus 
agricultural labour!). It was certainly out of the question that 




























































































summed up the position by saying that Italy, because it might be 
harmed by staying cut, would have to participate in any discussions 
with "a prudent scepticism" ar.d that the French and Dutch plans 
would be "only realisable with difficulty" ('ll).
The difficulty which Grazzi foresaw was already becoming plain 
in France itself. Guy Mc.llet, the Minister for Affairs of the 
Council cf Europe, wanted Monnet left cut of the proposed 
conference on the grounds that too much talk of a "high Authority" 
would frighten away the participants (42). The FNSFA, while 
supporting the idea of European prices, high ones, isolated from 
world prices by a tariff guaranteeing protection against extra- 
European imports, did net support such a scheme if it were 
restricted to "the Fix" (although the United Kingdom did not 
necessarily have to be a member). Even the support they did give 
was wrapped in much language about retaining the family farm as. the 
pillar of French society, which contrasted rather oddly witli the 
productivist language cf Pflir.ilin's own policy- statements (43). 
Pflimlin himself saw the problem both in an immediate c*ccr.cn.ic art! 
a long-term political perspective. If it were possible eventually 
to progress by means of agreement, c n ac-ricultural trade to a 
further stage of European integration, he would clearly have beet- 
glad to keep that prospect open, but not at the expense of the 
immediate economic solution he was lo’oking for. Everything depended 
on which countries would join the agreement ar.d what the powers of 
the "High Authority" might be. In these circumstances he accepted 
the political reality that the invitation to the conference should 
be issued in the first place tc all OFEC members and rot confined 




























































































and on what happened at the conference when it was called. However, 
the invitation.itself was in some ways a rejection both of Monnet's 
and Mansholt's ideas. The ministers of agriculture should meet, 
Pflinilin proposed in the invitation, which was eventually issued in 
March, to organize a "European Agricultural Committee". This in 
turn would prepare the way for a common market in agriculture for 
the products in which it was necessary. These would be, at a 
minimum, wheat, sugar, dairy products and wine. The common market 
would have similar institutions to the ECSC. The Court of Justice 
would be shared. The market wculd net, however, necessarily be 
restricted to the members of the ECSC (44). Yet this still left 
open the possibility that a large number of rejections w!ould be 
received or that the conference would meet and that the number of 
countries then proceeding to form a common market would be 
equivalent to the Six, plus perhaps Denmark. At least this would 
have been a reasonable interpretation in Paris and in that sense 
the terms in which Pfliiulin's invitation were eventually couched 
were a satisfactory political' compromise.
From the date on which Pflimlin's invitations were issued to 
the eventual official demise of the idea of a separate European 
"committee", "board”, cr "High Authority" with special powers over 
west European agriculture there were almost four years of detailed 
diplomatic negotiations. The eventual official demise of the 




























































































the agreement reached in January 1955 to confine discussions on 
intra-west-European agricultural trade cr.cc more within the OEEC. 
These negotiations are in many ways as crucial to an understanding 
of the problems of intra-west-European agricultural trade as the 
sudden rise to prominence of the idea of an Agricultural Community. 
But to recount them and to elaborate their significance would take 
up several other papers. A summary of the events, however, is 
needed to cast further light cr. the collapse of the concept of an 
Agricultural Community.
It was already clear from the attitude of the Deutscher 
Bauernverband and of the Italian government that the chances of the 
successful formation of ar. Agricultural Community were small even 
should the French and the Dutch agree on a common programme of 
action. It is some measure of the seriousness of the problems 
involved in establishing a framework of foreign trade for western 
Europe's highly-protected agriculture that it took so lor.g to 
officially bury an idea which seemed to have so little life in it 
when it was born. No country except the Uniteo Kingdom, no matter 
how hostile it was tc the idea of a Community, was prepared to hand 
matters back again to the OEEC which had proved sc. ineffective. 
Most hoped that something less than a Community could be created, a 
series of interlinked agreements covering certain commodities which 
would permit guaranteed markets tc producers whose output was 
growing under the stimulus of government policy everywhere. From 
the moment when Pflimlin's invitations were issued there was in 
effect e separate organisation frem the OEEC in existence. To this 
the name "Green Pool" was usually given, perhaps because it covered 




























































































conference. We cannot be concerned here with the detailed and 
laborious studies of intra-vest-European agricultural trade which 
the "Green Pool" undertook, nor with the separate attempts at trade 
agreements carried cn under its aegis, but only with the broad 
political outlines of the Agricultural Community's evolution and 
collapse.
The expected hostile responses to the invitation came at once 
from such countries as Switzerland and Sweden while the United 
Kingdom insisted that there was no need for any organization other 
than the OEEC. Italy had been given some more detailed knowledge of 
the French proposals provided to the onfederazione 
dell1Agricoltura by the CCA in February 1951. Pflimlin, it was 
explained, would be content to emerge from the conference with a 
common market for wheat and for dairy products, excluding cheese, 
and with an international statute governing wine production and 
trade, together with some further measures of "market 
rationalization". The Italian view of these aims was that they were 
"detailed international dirigisme" based on "equivalent domestic 
dirigisme". They would exclude Britain and thus would be damaging 
to Italy's interest. A "High Authority" would be "inopportune" 
(45). The Luxembourg government handed the proposals at once to the 
Centrale Paysanne, which embraced most Luxembourg producers, and 
got a very discouraging reply (46). In any case Luxembourg was not 
even prepared to attend unless the conference gave prior 
recognition to the completely protected status of Luxembourg's 
agriculture within Benelux. The Germans were non-committal. The 
Danes, to the annoyance of London, made it clear that anything was 




























































































after some initial debate accepted that one outcome might be the 
separation of a group of countries prepared to accept the principle 
of a High Authority from the rest, providing the rest, of which the 
United Kingdom would be the crucial component, would still be in a 
position to negotiate some form of associative agreement with the 
new organization should it come into permanent existence (47). This 
was a political compromise r.ct unlike that which had enabled the 
French to proceed.
There then followed a long and complicated series of struggles 
in the French government over the familiar territory disputed 
before the invitation was sent. The question of the exclusion of 
the United Kingdom inevitably was seen in the context of France's 
commitment, so bitterly opposed by many in political life, to a 
European Defence Community without British participation. 
In January 1952 Monnet took advantage of a cabinet crisis to demand 
the withdrawal of the invitations and a return to the idea of a 
conference involving "the Six" alone. The others should he informed 
of the state of the negotiations only when they had reached the 
stage of agreement. They could then consider "association" without 
being allowed in any way to change the terms cf the existing 
agreement (48). The unenthusiastic nature of the replies to 
Pflimlin's invitations, the fact that Pflimlin himself had left the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the wait for ratification of the Coal and 
Steel Comrriunity Treaty, and the furious internal debate over the 
Defence Community treaty, all contributed to this sense of 
uncertainty. The space of time also allowed the French employers' 
association, the Conseil i.ational du patronat français, to organize 




























































































industries and food distributive trades, the first confined to "the 
Six" and the second widened to admit delegates from Denmark, Spain 
and Sweden, which denounced the idea that prices should be set by 
any High Authority, especially if the Authority "were confided to 
the arbitrary powers of a bureaucratic organisation". No High 
Authority should "modify by authoritarian methods the structure of 
the processing and distribution circuits". (49)
This wavering was bound to have its effect in the Hague where 
the governmental divisions were no less. Spierenburg, the head of 
the Dutch negotiating team in the Schuman Plan negotiations, tried 
to persuade the French tc partially set aside the terms of 
Pflimlin's invitation and call an informal meeting of the foreign 
ministers, economic itinisters and ministers of agriculture of "the 
Six" at The Hague to try to link the proposals to all the other 
"Community" proposals then under discussion. The French accepted 
but only on condition that a serious effort would be made to get 
British and Danish participation as "associates" in the actual 
conference. This led to a further breakdown on what the precise 
difference wculd be in such an "informal" conference between "the 
Six" on the one side and Britain and Denmark on the other. Pflimlin 
then decided tc gamble everything on a meeting of "the Six" alone 
as Mansholt wished him to do, but this proposa) was turned down by 
the French Council of Ministers mainly on the strong opposition of 
René Mayer (50). Even after Monnet's attempt in January 1952 to 
persuade the ministers to repeat the negotiating tactics of the 
Schuman Plan treaty had failed Mansholt was still able to visit 
Paris in February hoping to persuade the French to call a 




























































































government this had now become the clear way forward, at least it 
was decided that an effort must be made in this direction, that 
"the Six" must be made to take trade liberalization seriously and 
that the proposed European Communities might be the way to make 
them do sc. Even Stikker had become convinced that a solution "a la 
Schumar. Plan" was now necessary for agriculture (51). All this was 
in the full awareness that the chances of producing such a solution 
were very small. The tactics, it was unanimously decided, with only 
Lieftinck showing marked dissent, should be to make Pflimlin stage 
his conference, place the question of a supranational High 
Authority with wide powers high on the agenda, and when the 
conference collapsed call a second conference of "the Six" which 
could later come tc some accommodation with the United Kingdom 
(52) .
This was the policy position which Mansholt took with him to 
Paris ir, February 1952 and Pflimlin was forewarned that Manshclt 
would insist c.n maintaining the principle of a high Authority and 
would, for that reason still ask for a preliminary meeting confined 
to "the Six” (53). Laurens flatly refused to call any such 
preliminary meeting and maintained that nothing could be done 
without the United Kingdom. Sc strong was Manshclt's insistence, 
however, that Pflimlin agreed to ask Schumar. to speak tc the 
foreign ministers of "the Six" at the NATO meeting in Lisbon and 
ascertain their opinion about a preliminary meeting on the eve of a 
larger conference (54).
As far as the either countries were concerned, though, it is 
clear that nothing had changed. The official position of the 




























































































of a common market, but that in practice this was only likely to be 
realizable in. wheat and sugar and even there only with great 
prudence. There could be no question of allowing French dairy 
exports to reduce dairy output in Germany. If there were a High 
Authority confined to wheat and sugar its powers would have to be 
closely circumscribed and exercised only in close coordination with 
the agricultural interest-groups themselves. (55) The Ministry of 
Agriculture in the Federal Republic appointed a committee of six 
academic experts to study the question and their report came down 
in favour of beginning, as many in France wished to do, by single­
product agreements, wheat being the obvious starting-point, and 
only when there was a sufficient number of such agreements 
considering a supranational authority (56). All these compromises 
would have been wholly unacceptable to the Ministry of the Economy 
which regarded them as protectionist deviations from the first 
priorities, currency convertibility and a wider geographical 
framework for freer trade than "the Six" would provide (57). If 
Germany was unencouragir.g, although not opposed, there was no hope 
of progress with Italy or Belgium. Italy would only participate in 
the conference if it included the largest possible number of OEEC 
member states and would not participate at all unless the United 
Kingdom were present. The conference would have to discuss the 
largest possible number of commodities including those previously' 
suggested by Italy and it would have to discuss the free migration 
of labour in western Europe. Unless' the French government supported 
these positions Italian participation "would proceed more from 
courtesy than from the firm intention of pursuing the study of this 




























































































had already given his opinion to Yves Malecot, Laurens's directeur 
du cabinet, when the Frenchman had visited the Belgian agricultural 
exhibition in February. "It appears", he had said, "that Belgian 
farmers are hostile on principle to any freedom for foreign 
competition." Even before the conference "they were decided to 
oppose the institution of any supranational authority." (59) So 
were the FNSEA. In a note to the minister in February they left no 
room for ambiguity. "A 'European Agricultural Community' has been 
talked about. It is obvious that the variety of output and the 
diversity of positions does not allow so general an objective to be 
envisaged from the start; that would in any case raise problems 
going beyond agriculture. We are envisaging in reality only the 
organisation of 'common markets for products'. It will be the task 
of the conference to determine the choice of the products which can 
be considered." (60) Worse, when Heger spoke officially at the 
Brussels show in front of Malecot, he "ardently" wished "that the 
French government would share the opinion of the French 
professional agricultural associations"! (61)
There was nothing to do but proceed with the conference 
according to the original invitations to all OEF.C member states. It 
met on 25 March 1952. Pflimlin came back from his new ministry to 
chair it. Schunan opened the proceedings, saying that the 
conference was intended to move towards another stage in the 
creation of a united Europe. Pflimlin took the same line. Laurens, 
however, was noticeably less enthusiastic than Pflimlin and Schuman 
about a common market and a supranational authority (62). What 
Pflimlin actually proposed was not in fact another High Authority 




























































































task of harmonizing policies on production, marketing and 
consumption. Mansholt made up for this with the fervour with which 
he pleaded the case for European integration under a supranational 
authority. The aim was one unified market governed by a High 
Authority and the Dutch government considered it impossible, he 
said, "to restrict, even at the start, agricultural integration to 
a limited number of products" (63).
The obvious opponents, Austria, Switzerland, Norway and Sweden 
all declared their opposition. Ireland could see no point in the 
proposals. Turkey was distinctly encouraging; like France it was 
developing wheat surpluses. This, naturally, did nothing to help 
Mansholt even though it presented another possible ally for the 
minimalist position in the French Ministry of Agriculture! Mansholt 
had argued so strongly in front of the conference precisely because 
the Dutch wanted the conference to collapse as quickly and 
comprehensively as possible, so that they could proceed to the 
conference of "the Six", in which smaller framework there might be 
some real hope of removing restrictions on agricultural exports. It 
was the position taken by the United Kingdom which destroyed, 
unwittingly, these Dutch tactics.
The United Kingdom had come, in fact, to the conclusion that 
if the further discussions could not be sent back again into the 
OEEC, and it did not look as though this would be possible at once, 
Britain would have to take part in them. The British archives 
reveal that this decision was not taken to help Guy Mollet and 
Monnet's other opponents in Paris. On the contrary, it was taken 
because most civil servants were genuinely afraid that so close a 




























































































that seme form of agricultural common market was inevitable! The 
British delegation, therefore, against the advice of the Minister 
of State in charge of the negotiations, Anthony Nutting, was 
instructed to take a position in favour of talks or. "association" 
even if the conference should agree to try to proceed with a common 
market or a "Community" (64). In so doing they made it certain that 
France would take what agreement it could get from the conference 
as a basis for further action and the Netherlands would be left 
stranded in the worst of all possible positions. There would be no 
conference of "the Six" anu there would be nr reference back to the 
OEEC; instead France, Germany and Italy would be able to continue 
within the framework of the "Green Pool" to- oxf 1< re a series of 
possible agricultural trade bargains, all of which would take for 
granted the continuation of very high levels of protection and none 
of which would take much account of Dutch interests.
So it proved. Italy spoke in favour of continuing a set of 
detailed studies. Germany accepted the principles of a common 
market as a good "European" cause but made it clear that the only 
thing that actually interested the German government was a step-by- 
step, commcdity-by-commodity negotiation. Denmark sat helplessly on 
the fence waiting to see what would happen and making the forlorn 
argument that liberalisation was bettor than ail those solutions. 
Pflimlin retreated to the FNSEA ground that the conference should 
study first only the question of which commodities should he 
coordinated and postpone all question of a Hiqh Authority to the 
future. A study of certain commodities, firstly those in which the 
French modernisation plans were primarily interested, was therefore 




























































































institutional arrangements necessary for common policies (on the 
Dutch demand) . What the Ir.terim Working Party effectively did was 
to set up commodity study groups in which the possibility of trade 
deals as a way of venting surpluses or. to foreign markets could be 
achieved and the committee which was to study institutional 
arrangements remained of no significance.
Until, however, Mansholt abandoned his position or the Dutch 
government changed its policy the European Agricultural Community 
clung to a kind of existence. In a sense it could not do otherwise 
when Dutch policy continued to be tc force the foreign ministers of 
"the Six" to agree to a common market for all goods as part of the 
European Political Community envisaged in the European Defence 
Community treaty. So long as the European Political Community was 
not officially dead the European Agricultural Community could not 
die because it was the only policy the Dutch government had to make 
the common market for all products possible. Mor.net, certainly, did 
not give up hope. He convinced himself that the FNSEA was actually' 
more interested in an "integrative" solution than the CGA and set 
up a working party including Louis Rabot, the head of foreign 
relations in the Ministry of Agriculture, tc draw up a new plan for 
a supranational authority (65). On his return from the conference 
Mansholt called together in "strict secrecy" a meeting of civil 




























































































Homan, Tinbergen, Samkalden and Kohnstanm to inform then; that he 
had agreed with Monnet that they should work together to produce a 
common experts' report (66). Not much happened, though. Monnet and 
his collaborators were busy churning out drafts of a second 
national plan in which agricultural surpluses would he even larger, 
although as Table 2 shows the actual surpluses in 1952 were far 
short of what the first Monnet Plan had envisaged. The second plan, 
which was not to be adopted by the government until 1954, was 
couched in even more productivist language than its precursor and 
had even less political appeal tc the farmers than that had done. 
The drafts were noticeably vague on the whole question of exports, 
except for the insistence that sugar wculd now become a major 
export both to the French empire and to the "Furcpean Community". 
Dairy products had new disappeared again as a likely export staple, 
meat had reappeared, and fruit now made its first appearance as a 
possibility! (67) It is hardly surprising that the problems of the 
future organisation of trade were being treated in no more 
realistic a way.
Mansholt and Monnet did not meet, agair until January 1953. 
This time Monnet was sailing on a different tack. He now thought 
agriculture should form cnly the last building block in the edifice 
of European integration! First should come a European parliament 
and European elections. Immediate moves to surrender any area of 
economic sovereignty, including that over agricultural trade, would 
impede the creation of the European Political Authority.
This left Mansholt on his own to face Laurens and to persuade 
him to persist in attempts to find an "integrative" solution. By 




























































































Pool" were coming in. It had been agreed tc call the ministers 
together again to consider these reports and to pronounce on what 
could be done. Laurens was, in familiar style, wavering as to 
whether they should be first considered by the ministers of "the 
Six" or by the sixteen who had attended the first conference. In 
November Mansholt met him and they agreed on a "top secret" 
protocol. They agreed that the Luxembourg Resolutions on a common 
market demanded a meeting of the foreign ministers and the 
agricultural ministers of "the Six" before February 1953. This 
should produce a supranational authority, but it w’ould have to be 
"noticeably different." from the High Authority of the ECSC. 
Membership of the new supranational organisation would entail 
acceptance of the terms of the Luxembourg Resolutions. Finally’, 
there would be an effort to build as close economic links as 
possible with the countries which could not accept these terms, 
perhaps by long-term trade contracts. Mcnnet’s staff were 
associated with this meeting and Rabot, who was there, argued on 
the Dutch side that it was impossible tc have a narrowly 
circumscribed list of products. He argued, too, for a High 
Authority with real and extensive powers (68). Of course, it is not 
known how highly Camille Laurens actually rated the chances of the 
European Defence Community treaty, and thus the Luxembourg 
Resolutions, of passing the National Assembly.
There followed a determined effort by Mansholt tc make the 
other members of "the Six" subscribe to the terms of this 
agreement. Amintore Far.fani, the Italian minister of agriculture, 
had already agreed, only with much reluctance, that there should on 




























































































of "the Six" before the full conference met. In January 1953 he 
showed that even this concession was not definitely made. Tc. the 
Dutch Ambassador in Rome, li . N . Boon, he praised Mansholt's 
"dirigiste" approach, but insisted that it was entirely 
inappropriate for Italy's nine million farms. As for a preliminary 
meeting of "the Six" to discuss the relationship of the 
Agricultural Community to the Luxembourg Resolutions, it had now 
become unacceptable and impossible because of the forthcoming 
elections. It was all very well, Fanfani was reported as saying, 
for de Gasperi to talk, about pclitical and economic integration; it 
was not he who had to deal with Italian farmers. The only kind of 
agricultural "integration" acceptable to Italy was in the form of 
multilateral trading agreements (69). It could be assumed from this 
in the Hague, rightly as it proved, that if the foreign ministers 
of "the Six" were tc decide that the agricultural ministers should 
meet to discuss the Luxembourg Resolutions, Fanfar.i would at least 
have to attend. Nothing else positive could be hoped for from him 
whatever de Gasperi might say.
Heger was less antagonistic and was prepared tc suoport a 
preliminary meeting of the agricultural ministers cf "the Six" tc 
discuss ways of setting up a European Agricultural Community, 
although he himself did not think such a s,tep tc be necessary. He 
himself was only in favour of a limited number of commodity 
agreements covering the widest possible number of countries and a 
certain . number of common regulations or perhaps only 
recommendations to achieve a sufficient degree cf harmony in 
national agricultural policies to make the agreements viable (7C). 




























































































OEEC. They wanted the whole idea of even a "Green Pool" "dropped 
completely". (71)
Immediately on the close of the first conference of the 
sixteen ministers the Deutscher Bauernverband had demanded that its 
wishes be given the fullest consideration in settling all further 
questions arising in the "Green Pool". (72) There seemed little 
danger that this would not be so, because the leader of the German 
delegation to the conferences and the most powerful influence on 
decisions made there by the German delegations was not the Minister 
of Agriculture himself but Hermes, the head of the Bauernverband 
who had been minister of agriculture thirty years before at the 
start of the Weimar Republic. It was his presence there that 
stimulated a few hopes in Paris and the Hague (although it 
stimulated much stronger antagonisms in Rome, London and Brussels), 
because he was known to be a close colleague of Adenauer from times 
past. Given the dependence of the CDU on rural votes and the 
attitude of the voters, however, this connection was more likely to 
be used to sway Adenauer away from the concept of an Agricultural 
Community. In June 1952 the Bauernverband and the French CGA again 
met and had no difficulty in agreeing to support a grain agreement 
in which a joint Franco-German committee of the interest groups 
should determine annual requirements and prices, a somewhat ironic 
note to Mor.net' s original organisational ambitions. The German side 
agreed to examine the timing of seasonal quotas on fruit and 
vegetable imports and made a further concession to their French 
counterparts when they agreed to recommend to the German ministers 
that they agree to create an international body' to control Europe's 



























































































de consommation courante (73). In the event local organisations of 
fruit and vegetable traders and growers displayed considerable 
alarm over this commitment on their behalf made by the 
Bauernverband in which they were federated. The Bauernverfcand had
obviously been driver, as far as it would go. It met with the
official representatives of the Belgian Bcerenbond and the
Luxembourg Central Paysanne and together with the Belgians passed a 
resolution, to which the Luxembcurgerr would not commit themselves, 
to say that there should be no High Authority to control a future 
Community and whatever arrangements were agreed on at the 
conference, even if they were purely trade and commodity 
agreements, should not be confined to the ECSC countries (74). This 
was what the State-Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Theodor Sonnemann, himself an appointee of the Bauernverband, told 
the Danes in December 1952 to be official German policy at the 
forthcoming conference (75). They had already been told by Mansholt 
that they were not wanted unless they were prepared to accept the 
full implications of the Luxembourg Resolutions (76). For them, 
there appeared no hope of relief on any side.
The Federal Ministry of the Economy was opposed even to 
commodity agreements, because it saw the whole affair as an attempt 
by the Ministry c,f Agriculture to cement agricultural protection 
even more firmly in place by international agreement. The removal 
of tariffs was not the first problem needing to be tackled, Erhard 
argued, but currency convertibility, and if tariff removal was such 
a necessity that an Agricultural Community had first to be created 
to make it possible it would emerge that any arrangement between 




























































































foreign trade in a much more protectionist mould than a wider 
agreement. In. short, nothing economically was to be gained from 
"the Six" at all. (77) In January 1953 Mansholt travelled to Bonn 
to talk, first to Wilhelm Niklas, the Minister of Agriculture, and 
then to Adenauer, in the hope of overcoming this opposition in the 
German cabinet. Adenauer supported Mansholt's position that there 
should be a preliminary meeting of the agricultural ministers cf 
"the Six", but he then went much further. The sacrifices which 
Germany would have to make, he said, in the cause of agricultural 
integration would amply be compensated by gains made from economic 
integration in other areas.
This muddle of opinion in the German government was partly the 
result of the complete lack cf systematic working practice which 
the German archives for this period and for this question reveal. 
Hermes was responsible as head cf the delegation only to Hallstein, 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and through him to the 
Chancellor. Erhard's only influence was likewise through the 
Chancellor. But despite Adenauer's great influence and in spite of 
his personal commitment to the solution which was eventually' to 
emerge after the Treaty cf Rome, he could not command through all 
these direct lines so large and complex a country. Below him the 
decision-making process was still formulating itself in 
bureaucratic ways familiar from Germany's past and from present 
practice in ether countries. The glee in the Hague at thus by­
passing German opposition and convincing the Chancellor, if he had 
needed convincing, that the Agricultural Community was the next 
step to take was short-lived. The position of Secretary cf State 




























































































delegate to the Interim Working Party of the "Green Pool" had 
"Angstvisionen" over the discussion in which he would have to 
inform Hermes of Adenauer's opinions (78). Nik)as would not accept 
a "Green Pool" of any kind without Danish membership and preferably 
other countries outside "the Six" too (79). The opposition to the 
possibility of commodity agreements on fruit and vegetables had 
grown. Rhineland growers objected to liberalising Dutch vegetable 
imports through any forthcoming agreements and their Bavarian 
colleagues had the same views about Italian imports. The agreement 
on wine had meanwhile collapsed and France had withdrawn it from 
the agenda for the future conference.
In any realistic view of the situation in Paris to gc. into a 
second conference of the agricultural ministers with the sole 
policy of supporting the Laurens-Mansholt agreement would be a 
disaster. Much of French agriculture was opposed, a large part of 
political opinion was opposed, and even those in the government who 
supported it were uneasy. It seemed to involve a commitment to 
present the European Defence Community treaty to the National 
Assembly with the full backing of the government not for that 
treaty alone but also for the Luxembourg Resolutions and the common 
market. The economic objectives of the Ministry of Agriculture 
alone hardly warranted so arastic a chair, r£ political actions. 
France was somewhat in tire position of a convinced but irresolute 
polygamist being forced through his own irresolution to marry a 
series of brides whom he did not wish to marry at all for a limited 
objective which could be obtained without marriage. When it row 
turned out that with one exception they' did not want to marry him 




























































































superimposed cn it was the great weight of the even more unreal 
European Defence Community. The time for the purging of these 
illusions had arrived.
When J.J. van der Lee, who as head of external relations in 
the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture served as Mansholt's right-hand 
man throughout the negotiations, went to Paris at the end of 
February the French were already in full retreat in face of the 
incontrovertible evidence from elsewhere and the aw7areness of their 
own unwillingness to accept the full political implications of the 
decisions they now felt they had been forced into making. They 
suggested that, regardless of any agreements between "the Six" in 
the preliminary conference, the sixteen should also try to reach a 
series of commodity agreements. This would obviously break the 
terms of the secret protocol between Laurens and Mansholt, so it 
was also suggested on the French side that the assembled ministers 
should receive two separate memoranda from the French and Dutch 
governments, one based on the secret protocol and one on the 
possibility of commodity agreements between the sixteen (80). In 
fact a week earlier, cn 21 February 1953, the French Council of 
Ministers had rejected the protocol as a basis for the conference 
and had destroyed the lest chances of the European Agricultural 
Community by deciding that its policy in the conference would have 
to be "the organisation of markets product by product". In spite of 
the Rome agreements and the Luxembourg Resolutions they had taken 
the view that the French government was free to propose an 
agricultural agreement between the sixteen and one which was in no 
sense a common market. Their decision was to start trying to reach 




























































































those which had initially been identified by the first Monnet Plan. 
The "Green Pool" working groups had revealed how diverse conditions 
of production and product markets were in European agriculture and 
the other countries had made this clear in their responses over a 
year and a half. The French government would therefore propose that 
the "Green Pool" set up a further series of working groups to study 
particular products and from those studies the first steps towards 
an eventual common market might appear (£1). Of supranaticnality 
and a High Authority there was to he nc more question, unless in a 
distant future as the result of much more pragmatic proceedings 
than had so far been witnessed.
As Laurens expressed it to his delegation after this crucial 
decision, "It is a question of looking for the lowest common 
denominator in the aspirations of the different countries 
interested in the issue of a European agricultural community". (82) 
A study of the global trade balances of each of the sixteen in 
agricultural trade would now be the best procedure, for it was 
possible that commodity agreements could eventually be struck so 
that the sixteen could absorb the surpluses. But in the first stage 
this could cover only products strictly confined to intra-west- 
Europeari trade in order to avoid all problems with countries which 
depended on extra-European food and feedstuff imports. This 
inevitably, he indicated, meant a direct clash with the Dutch. The 
only way of avoiding this was by preparing two policy positions for 
submission to the conference, one with the Dutch and one without 
them. This, of course, was the suggestion made to van der I.ee a 




























































































The agricultural ministers of "the Six" met on 14 March, two 
days before the conference of the sixteen ministers. Even before 
the meeting officially began Laurens told Mansholt that the 
memorandum which he presented based on their protocol needed 
"petites retouches". What those amounted to was that the only 
purpose of the preliminary conference now was to discuss the full 
conference. When the meeting officially started nobody would agree 
that the Dutch memorandum should be the main item on the agenda, 
but only that it might be discussed at the end, if there was time. 
The six ministers then began to work out a limited list of products 
to be discussed by the sixteen. Eventually Mansholt's patience 
broke. He declared that if the meeting was going to turn into a 
conspiracy he had no intention of staying. To placate him it was 
agreed to discuss the Dutch memorandum there and then. Fanfani 
declared that the decisions of the six foreign ministers fell 
outside his responsibility and that he would certainly not commit 
himself to anything until after the conference. Heger declared 
himself "perplexed" that the Dutch Minister of Agriculture should 
want to settle large political questions, to which Mansholt replied 
that he, too, was "perplexed" that the Belgian Minister of 
Agriculture was willing to leave his government in the lurch on 
such - an important matter. It was only Hermes, whose intention was 
doubtless now to get the body of the dead European Agricultural 
Community off the stage as quickly as possible, who was able to 
persuade the conference to proceed towards its due end and into its 
meeting with the sixteen (83). Even by that meeting two days later 
the Dutch delegation had buried the corpse and vigorously supported 




























































































whole question back into the confines of the OEEC. Nothing else, of 
course, for them new made sense, for the "Green Pool" would 
certainly be a protectionist club whereas in the OEEC there was 
some faint chance that this might be less so.
CONCLUSIONS
Two conclusions are inescapable. The first is that the 
national origins of the European Agricultural Community as it 
briefly became, were too divergent for the idea ever to be 
translated into an effective international agreement. This is so 
when we consider the divergence in aims betv:eer; nations and also 
when we consider the divergence within nations.
Between nations, the objectives of France and the Netherlands 
were different in important ways. Or. the face of things the origins 
of the European Agricultural Community as a concept in France are
to be found in the Ministry of Agriculture and in the Planning
Commissariat, neither of which it might be sup>pcsed had much
influer.ee on the vital questions of national security with which
France had to deal in these years. But that is a superficial view. 
The first National Plan fer Modernisation and Reequipment (the 
Monnet Plan) had important repercussions on French foreign policy. 
Its longer-term implications, the assumption that it would be or.lv 
the first of a series of planned interventions by tle state to 




























































































even more consequences for the reactions of the other European 
countries. In. the short-term it focussed French policy on the 
question of German reconstruction, intensively, narrowly, often 
obsessively, and for a long time on the question of the supply of 
coke and Ruhr coking-coal. Without a guaranteed supply of both 
commodities at a satisfactory level the Monnet Plan was simply 
unachievable, and this made it seem as though France's domestic 
economic reconstruction was unachievable v'ithout internationally- 
guaranteed constraints on German reconstruction (84). In this way 
the Monnet Plan provided a practical goal at which French diplomacy 
could aim. Something of this kind, something which appeared 
feasible, although limited, and whicli could be expressed in terms 
of immediate pragmatic action was badly needed. Until that time 
French foreign policy towards Germany had been based on a set of 
impossible objectives, fragmentation, annexation, prevention of any 
central German government and so on, combined with a generalised 
assumption that French recovery must precede that of Germany. This 
assumption was too diffuse to be translated into a practical 
programme of action on any particular question when faced with the 
realities of American power in Germany. The Monnet Plan explained 
what French reconstruction was and what the German economy had to 
contribute to it if it was to be achieved. It is not surprising 
therefore that its implications should have beer, seized on by 
Alphand and by others in the French Foreign Ministry', particularly 
in the European Section, because they provided one constant thread 
through the tortuous maze of international discussions with the 
British and. the Americans ever Germany between 1945 and 1952. Thus 



























































































translating the Potsdam agreements into a lcnger-terrr. guarantee by 
the Americans of German imports for French steel-making, through 
French officials on the Coal and Steel Control Beards in Germany, 
through control over German coal arid coke experts by the 
International Ruhr Authority, through "de-carte]isation" of the 
Ruhr coal and steel industries, and then through, the European Coa] 
and Steel Community, which emerged to remedy the deficiencies of 
these other policies.
The "European" solution, the concept of a "Community" and a 
High Authority proved, of course, to be more effective than earlier 
policies, not only from France's point of view but from that of the 
other western countries too. In the five years between 1945 and 
1950 Konnet and the French Foreign Ministry had moved a long way, 
from grasping the inherent connection between short-term imports 
from America for French recovery and short-term imports from, 
Germany, to the idea that France's needs could be better expressed 
to its allies if drawn up in the concept of the medium-term Monnet 
Plan, to using the Mor.net Plan as the basis for political action in 
the OEEC, to using it as the basic guide for action in the 
International Ruhr Authority', ard finally' to translating the Monr.et 
Plan to the international letel in the European Coal and Steel 
Community. Uhen trie decision was made to increase French domestic 
agricultural output over the long-term and to develop aoricultural 
surpluses as a way of effecting a long-term change in the French 
balance-of-payments position, it coincided ir. time v.’ith the French 
decision to use the Konnet Plan as the basis for the national 
contribution to the OEKC’s abortive efforts at producing a medium- 





























































































accommodate the concept of agricultural surpluses, this new policy, 
too, became a further basis for immediate political action in the 
OEEC. From there it was almost automatic that it should follow» the 
same path as that followed by policy cn the coke and cokir.g-coal 
problem; a solution in France's favour which proved impossible in 
OEEC might alternatively be achieved by a "Community" and a "High 
Authority". In this case it was not the Foreign Ministry which 
acted together with the Planning Commissariat to try to create a 
European framework within which the Mcnnet Plan could be 
successful, but the Ministry of Agriculture, for the obvious reason 
that its practical interest in the matter was as immediate as that 
of the Foreign Ministry was in the question of Germany.
What was at stake for France here, too, was the national 
commitment to change the country's relative place and status in 
western Europe; the planned agricultural surpluses had become as 
much a part of this programme as the planned increases in steel 
output and the increased inputs of coke and coal from Germany which 
they necessitated. A Europe which would take French food exports 
became in 1948 as necessary as a Europe which w»ould permit the 
French steel industry to operate at higher levels of output had 
become in 1946. That this was not a last-minute pragmatic 
adjustment to the acute food shortages of winter 1947/8 is clear 
from the correspondence between Pflimlin and Monnet, with its hints 
of earlier general agreement between the two men cn the 
relationship of France to western Europe, as well as from the 
wholly specious economic arguments presented both in the revised 
version of the First Modernisation Plan and in the Second Plan for 




























































































pleading that western Europe's food surpluses have been induced by 
the automatic processes of technological change ir highly-developed 
agricultural systems, the evidence in this paper strongly persuades 
to the argument, supported of course by much ether evidence, that 
they were policy-induced. Governments sought, agricultural surpluses 
and the French plans only aimed at the same general target as 
unplanned economies elsewhere. On the other hand these agricultural 
policies clearly were a pragmatic adjustment to the unforeseen 
consequences of high investment levels on the balance of payments 
position, in France as elsewhere, ir. a world where the dollar 
shortage lasted longer and was more acute than had been foreseen. 
Coke imports ana wheat exports stood alike as symbols of a 
commitment, widely held at many different levels to alter France's 
relationships to western Europe, a process which began by altering 
the path of development tf the French economy through a long-term 
process of domestic economic and political charge. The idea of a 
"Community" and of a "high Authority" existed for Monnet because 
these institutions could provide some effective international 
guarantee of that alteration.
For the Netherlands, ttie issue turned on r.recisely what the 
alteration ir. the relatior.shir. with France within the new’ 
"Community" would be ana to what extent, it would further the 
Netherlands' own objectives. The origins of the Dutch, proposals, at 
least as they emerged after much alteration from cabinet, is 
equally clear. They were part of a sustained campaign, which took 
many forms in the 1950s, for lower tariffs and more liberal foreiqn 
trade policies in westerr. Europe. This was a vital matter of 




























































































it always has been. The failure cf the trade liberalization 
programme in the OEEC to make any significant difference to the 
levels of agricultural protection in. western Europe and the failure 
of the GATT to reduce agricultural tariffs affected almost 40% of 
total Dutch exports. By contrast, the Netherlands maintained very 
low tariffs against industrial imports. Dutch governments show’ed 
themselves ready to support a remarkably' wide variety of policy 
positions in the hope of reducing obstacles to trade in both 
industrial and agricultural products, "sectoral integration" (the 
Stikker Plan of Action), a common market as part of the proposed 
European Political Community (the Bey'en Plan), and the extension of 
European preference zones (on several occasions). None of these had 
very much in common at the level of actual functioning with 
Mansholt's proposals. But of course none of them offered a solution 
to the problem of intra-west-Eurcpean agricultural trade either, 
because no country except Denmark was prepared ever, to contemplate 
a genuine measure of liberalization in agricultural trade, 
including the Netherlands itself. From the moment that Stikker's 
proposals recognized the need for "special" action in the 
agricultural sector the Netherlands had to he prepared tc negotiate 
such "special" action at an international level. No-one in the OEEC 
had paid much attention tc the needs of western Europe’s net 
agricultural exporters; they were too small. The change of domestic 
policy in France was a possible opportunity and some effort had to 
be made to take it. This was the strength of Mansholt's position. 
No matter how much other ministers from other parties disliked such 
interventionist schemes they had to admit that as far as primary 




























































































the slightest chance cf success. If they looked at Denmark's 
foreign balances ir. 1950 and 1951, if they considered the 
difference which the Dutch-German trade treaty cf 1949 made to 
Dutch exports, they' had to allow seme modified form, of the Kansholt 
proposals to serve as a basis fer negotiations to create a common 
front with France.
In 1950, even in 1951, it was possible that the Ketherlands 
and France might in fact agree or. a programme of gradual removal of 
barriers to intra-west-European trade era that Kansholt's (or 
Pflirnlin's) "special" arrangement for agricultural trade would be 
the permissive agreement which allowed mere genuine liberalisation 
in trade in other sectors, that Mansholt and Pflimlir. through the 
European Agricultural Community might remove the very barriers to 
trade liberalization which had stepped the OF.EC trade 
liberalization programmes. But after 1951 the conviction grew ir. 
France, shared by all parties, that the French economy' was becoming 
less competitive than that of its neighbours, specifically less 
competitive than that of the Federal Republic, and that for this 
reason tariff reductions and quota removals were dangerous. An
Agricultural Community which vas not instrumental in lowering
barriers to trade in ether sectors was simply not worth the
sacrifice involved for the Netherland s. At some time, on some
distant horizon, when the medium-term plans had made the French 
economy mere competitive, it was the intention of the Planning 
Commissariat to lower the barriers around the frontiers and, 
following their beliefs, allow international influences to increase 
the level of productivity in France. Foreigners can be forgiven for 




























































































for it appeared to be receding after 1951 when the protectionist 
impulse of politicians was often supported by the planners. In 
short, for most of the period over v.’hich the attempt at a European 
Agricultural Community was made France was interested in 
maintaining protection and the Netherlands was interested in 
reducing it.
It is in this light that one charge subsequently made against 
the European Agricultural Community, that it had to fail because it 
was negotiated separately from a network of economic agreements 
covering other sectors, should be judged. The accusation appears 
ridiculous. Agriculture was a separate problem from the other 
economic issues which were negotiated at the OEEC, because the 
agricultural sector had a unique economic status and political 
position in each country. In any case, it can only have been to the 
advantage cf the Agricultural Community that for much of the time 
it did not become immediately involved in the baroque and 
increasingly unpropitious negotiations ever the European Political 
Community, which were themselves dependent on the hopelessly 
unrealistic Defence Community treaty. And tc argue that the Common 
Agricultural Policy was later achieved because the commitment to a 
common market was already signed is to forget that it was only the 
fact that a similar agreement had already been signed which kept 
the Agricultural Community alive from, summer 1952 to summer 1953, 
to forget also the impact cf de Gaulle's return to power on the 
new-born common market, and also to forget that although we now 
have much historical evidence about the negotiation of the Treaty 
of Rome, about the negotiation of the various agricultural 




























































































agriculture we know very little. The Treaty of Rome did not really 
get much further than Stikker. It acknowledged that to reduce 
intra-west-Eurcpean trade barriers a "special" arrangement was 
necessary for agriculture, and then, like Stikker, washed its hands 
of the affair. We are left wondering how the problem could have 
been resolved, because it is evident in the case of the European 
Agricultural Community that the degree of common interest, even 
when the discussions were confined strictly to. the agricultural 
sector and kept as free as possible from all issues of defence, 
industry and constitutional sovereignty, was inadequate to arrive 
at any international agreement.
The Netherlands was a net importer on annual average of 
roughly 800,000 tonnes of bread grains. But as all discussions ir.
the cabinet showed the price of broad grain was an extremely
neuralgic political issue . Low wages in relation to its west
European neighbours meant the Netherlands' bread price had to be
low7. Although on balance the Netherlands was a sugar importer,
within the OEEC countries it was a sugar exporter, raw sugar being 
imported from the dollar zone and overseas territories and refined 
sugar being exported to European markets. The only interest the 
Dutch had in the wine trade was in preserving the liberty tc buy
where they wanted. And as for dairy products and meat it was
difficult to see to where in western Europe France would direct its 
planned export surpluses if not to markets where they would compete 
with Dutch goods! The common front would have had to consist 
essentially of an export cartel directed against the United Kingdom 
and Germany. French partnership in such a cartel was simply net




























































































German markets would have been no less monopsonistic. For Holland 
they might have eventually become smaller by the share conceded to 
France. And the possibility that in return the French butter and 
cheese markets would be opened to the Netherlands never looked as 
though it would materialize, indeed when it was being discussed 
French dairy farmers in the central regions were rioting to achieve 
higher guaranteed prices and the same measures of protection as 
arable farmers had already gained.
Above these considerations of prices and markets stood, it 
might be argued, the greater idea of "Europe", the idea that the 
ECSC would not stand alone, but that an economic sector determining 
the livelihoods of far more people would be immediately associated 
with it. But the debates in the French Asserribly on the European 
Agricultural Community proposals revealed no glimmer of anything 
except a "Europe" designed solely tc help French planners and the 
French economy. The FNSEA displayed exactly the same attitude and 
it was their narrow realism which Laurens represented. He was 
interested in specific export markets for specific products and it
has to be said in retrospect that this was also the heart of the
matter fcr Pflimlin and for Monnet, in as much as they rightly
sensed that "Europe" had tc have a functional purpose. Robert
Schuman blessed the idea of a second stage of the "Community" based 
on agriculture, but whereac the Foreign Ministry had been prepared 
to fight for the Schuman Plan, because for France the relationship 
with Germany was, literally, a matter of life or death, 





























































































A glance at Table 2 will show that the Monnet Plan fell 
ludicrously short of achieving the ambitious programmes which had 
initiated the very idea of an Agricultural Community in France. The 
sugar surplus had developed, but was much smaller than forecast; 
the wheat surplus, exported as flour, was not much more than one- 
tenth of that forecast; the meat and butter surpluses v;ere in not 
much larger proportion; and dried milk still hardly existed as an 
export. When the second conference cf the "Green Pool" net in 1953 
France was on balance still a net fend importer from "the Six". The 
reality was that the United Kingdom remained France's best market. 
Fruit and vegetable exporters still had a privileged position there 
(which would have been weakened by almost any conceivable outcome 
of the conference!). French imports of fruit, vegetables and 
tobacco w!ould have to be increased even as the price of a set of 
commodity agreements in the "Green Pool". The refusal of Sweden and 
Switzerland to associate themselves even with a limited "Greer. 
Pool", which seemed all too probable, would exclude two countries 
with which France did actually have a surplus in agricultural 
trade. 1953 was a year of recession in western Rurc.,pe and French 
prices were higher than these- cf their competitors, so that 
exporting was becoming ever more difficult and this could hardly bo 
avoided even in an Agricultural Community. it had to bo asked 
wherein the precise economic advantage for France lay in an 
Agricultural Community or in a set cf "Green Pool" commodity 
arrangements. The only convincing answer in 1953 was that it nicht
serve to get rid cf the wheat and sugar surplus. The political 
price to pay for this, to say nothing of the eventual price to bo 




























































































arrangements had permitted "the Six" to proceed to a full common 
market, was wildly disproportionate to the gain, the sale of what 
still only amounted tc 165,000 tonnes of sugar and 195,000 tonnes 
of wheat flour.
And was there any point in such a fight when much of Germany 
was essentially opposed to a second stage of "Europe" based on an 
Agricultural Community? Adenauer's goodwill in the matter was 
insufficient. German farmers, CDU voters, were against it. So were 
their powerfully-established interest-groups. What would the 
Federal Republic gain from an Agricultural Community? Recognition 
as a more or less equal European partner outside the realm of coal 
and steel now meant equality, or something near to it, in the 
Defence Community. There were no purely diplomatic gains to be won 
by accession to the Agricultural Community which had not already 
been won through acceptance of the Schuman proposals. What of the 
other countries? In the Schuman Plan negotiations overriding issues 
of European reconstruction and security had led the Netherlands and 
Italy to accept that the future Franco-German relationship was more 
important than the particularist interests of their ccal and steel 
industries. In any case the concessions made to them in the 
negotiations were very generous. Belgium had been left with no 
choice but to go along, grudgingly. Without a Franco-German axis 
there was no reason at all for the other countries to accede to an 
Agricultural Community unless they had substantial gains to make by 
doing so. The reality was that they would face, on the contrary, 
substantial political opposition. Their farmers looked on the idea 
of subjection to a High Authority with cold hostility. They 




























































































had become very professionally equipped to deal since 1931 and out 
of which they had wrung since 1945 considerable financial 
advantages. In Belgium, especially, nobody’ wanted to hear of a High 
Authority again.
The differences of opinion between farmers and government are 
just as evident in France and the Netherlands themselves and so are 
the differences within the governments. Lack of genuine national 
agreement between the two proponents of the Agricultural Community' 
was in fact the result of a lack of domestic agreement within each 
country on the same question.
French planners sav; agricultural surpluses as a means of 
lowering prices by increasing productivity, at least they and 
Monnet in particular constantly claimed that this would happen, 
although they may have been merely assimilating some rather 
unpleasant facts of political life into their rather glibly 
comprehensive theories on modernisation. They certainly did not see 
the changes in agricultural policy in 1948 as a barrier to 
modernisation and were determined tc make land redistribution and 
more rational methods of production and marketing a reality’. From 
this came Hornet's idea that the trade in French and European 
surpluses would be regulated by national producers' associations 
with powers of intervention legitimated by, and legitimating in 
their turn, a High Authority’. The producers themselves, though, 
only wanteu intervention to keep up prices and incomes and the idea 
of a supranational authority which would have similar newers of 
intervention in the domestic economy to those of the High Authority' 
of the ECSC was repugnant to them because it was. thought in France 




























































































sector along the lines to which the first post-war governments had 
aspired. The .producers, through those bodies which more directly 
represented their interest, were only interested in the 
Agricultural Community if it provided a market in Germany for their 
output. The advantages which Monnet and Pflimlin saw in it as a 
possible extra-national policy instrument for domestic change were 
to them only a threat to be resisted. An extra-national policy 
instrument which guaranteed French exporters access to the German 
market might have been worth making certain concessions to the 
government for; but the attitude of the beutscher Bauernverband had 
already made it clear in 1950 that this was unlikely to happen 
except for French wheat farmers, whose influence over French 
farmers' policies was strong only when it was not necessary to 
count votes. For the far more numerous farmers whose cash crops 
were dairy produce or wine the German market still looked 
impenetrable no matter how long the Agricultural Community was 
discussed.
In the Netherlands there was, by contrast, a harmony between 
producers and the Ministry of Agriculture. But almost everyone else 
in the government was deeply suspicious and supported the 
Agricultural Community only as a way of lowering the barriers to 
trade in industrial goods as well. For them the Community meant 
high food prices and there was never any political consensus fer 
Mansholt's plans except as a purely instrumental device to achieve 
something further. Had Manshclt obtained French agreement to his 
own "special" arrangement for agriculture it is by no means obvious 
that the Dutch government and parliament would have sanctioned the 




























































































proposed European Political Community without substantial 
modifications. After the rejection of the European Defence 
Community treaty ar.d all its political implications there would 
have been no point, fc.r the other economic sectors in the
Netherlands ar.d Dutch ccnsun.ers would have been paving the pr ice
for another stage of a "Con>Funity" , wh .i 1 e cbta i r. i n g none <of the
other goals of their foreign eernoTJ i C p cl icy in which ther.e
agricultural arrangements had beer, merely one instrumental part and 
the part for which there was the least consensus.
For Dutch farmers Pritish markets remained of central 
importance. French wheat exporters had not much to hone for from, 
the United Kingdom;, as Hor.net' s early efforts in the CT.rc medium- 
term plan showed. Butter exporters were rot likely to make inroads 
into that preportior. of the market reserved for extra-European 
supply as long as Dominion preferences remained. They would have to 
compete against the Dutch anu the Danes ar.d the experience of the 
early 1950s showed they coulu r.ot yet do sc. The Plan had r.ot 
equipped them with the centralised refrigeration, harbour aid 
packaging installations necessary; like many of Konnet's ambitious 
programmes this had not beer, backed up by adequate financial 
action. Meat exporters faced similar problems; unless the British, 
could be persuaded to eat nr re charcutcrle, which they7 scarcely ate 
in the 1950s, France would have to expert barer; is. direct 
competition with Denmark and this, too, required domestic 
investment programmes on a scale beyond anything the bonnet Plan 
had managed to achieve. The two groups of French farmers with 
continuous, high-value markets in Britain were spring vegetable and 




























































































except through the efforts tc obtain advance warning of seasonal 
import quotas. An Agricultural Community which excluded the United 
Kingdom meant on balance at the time of the negotiations a loss to 
French farmers, scarcely compensated by future visions, mainly 
false, of a soaring demand for French staple foodstuffs in the ECSC 
countries.
For Dutch farmers the loss would have been much greater; they 
ran the risk of losing their main market. An Agricultural Community 
of "the Six" would have left Dutch exports ever more at the mercy 
of British protectionism. After such an action claims for special 
consideration would not have been worth making. Britain's 
"association" with the Coal and Steel Community was based on 
inescapable economic needs. It was hard to see what inescapable 
economic need Britain had of Dutch agriculture, particularly if 
Denmark did not join the Community. A second stage of the 
"Community" might appear an irrevocable and hostile declaration of 
political commitment towards "the Six" and away from the United 
Kingdom with drastic consequences for Dutch trade and perhaps for 
Dutch defence and security toe, a commitment tc the still uncertain 
Franco-German alliance supported by a still uncertain United States 
which was likely to bring only grave economic disadvantages. A 
second stage of "Europe", wholly in the French interest and 
pattern, was not worth it because it did not really' promise a 
solution to the particular problems which the Netherlands now 
faced.
Germany's intentions were to become self-sufficient in butter 
and dairy produce and this point was in fact obtained while the 




























































































Germany, ether than live beasts, were also a diminishing prospect, 
for similar reasons. Major sections of the Dutch export trade were 
becoming more dependent on the British, market as negotiations 
continued which envisaged a "Community" which would obviously 
exclude Britain. Whether the United Kingdom should be excluded if 
it proved necessary, was a question, however, which did not 
primarily concern agricultural trade. It was the further political 
implications of such a decision vhich divided both hutch, and Frer.cli 
governments very seriously. Mansho.lt's commitment to a further 
stage of "Europe" only wiuer.ee the gap be tv con himself ar.d his 
fellow ministers, because an Agricultural Community of "the Six" 
automatically excluded the United Kingdom r.uch more definitively 
than the Coal and Steel Community had done. So too did Monnet's 
commitment to the same cause divide him fro.n French go vernments. 
They rejected his method of conducting the negotiations, which he 
had struggled to impose on Pflimlir., they rejected his 
interventionist ambitions, and they rejected him. This does not, 
however, seem to have made then, any more able to agree amongst 
themselves. The question of France's future relationship to tire 
United Kingdom, was obviously much wider than the issues raised by- 
agriculture and for much of the time French politicians were mostly 
concerned with the future location cf Givi tier, t of the British army 
and not with the future status cf French vegetable exports to the 
United Kingdom.
It is obvious that the presence of the United Kingdom, with a 
protectionist agricultural system which could not even be readily 
assimilated into those cf the other countries, because it was based 




























































































to agreement between "the Six", which was not reduced by any 
decision to exclude the United Kingdom from the proposed Community.
During the course of the negotiations, however, an almost 
equally massive barrier appeared for France in the shape of its 
overseas territories. The astonishing thing is for how long its 
existence was ignored or played down. It never appeared as an issue 
at all in the negotiations until February 1951 as the response to a 
hint from the Danes that they might be more interested in the whole 
affair if the French Empire was included. They could then have 
saved dollars by importing some of their fodder and fat imports in 
francs from French overseas territories. This immediately provoked 
the crushing reply from François Mitterand, who was then Secretary 
of State to the Presidency cf the Council, that if the overseas 
territories had to admit other European food exports to help the 
Danes they would obviously ask for reverse preferences throughout 
western Europe for their own exports (85). It could not help but be 
admitted that this was a fact of life, but even then any 
investigation cf the trading relationships of the overseas 
territories to the European Agricultural Community was remarkably 
desultory. It almost seemed as though those in Paris were more 
immediately concerned with the preference arrangements between 
Britain and its overseas territories. It was the opinion of Edward 
Lloyd, who was chiefly concerned with these negotiations in the 
United Kingdom Ministry of Agriculture, that in March 1952 Pflimlin 
had "only just realized" that the integration of France's overseas 
territories with ax; integrated European market might be difficult 
(86). Yet it is clear that in the decision by the Council of 




























































































much of the discussion and weighed heavily in their considerations. 
The overseas territories, they decided, posed an insuperable 
problem to any Agricultural Community which resembled the ECSC, a 
problem which could be avoided by choosing the "product by oromict" 
approach (87). As Laurens made clear afterwards, this decision was 
also taken with British "overseas territories" in mind; only tlie 
"product by product" approach would allow France to construct 
commodity' deals which included British Commonwealth and Er.pire 
countries as well (88).
The catalogue of reasors why the Euiopean Agricultural 
Community failed to emerge seems almost endless. Yet, eventually 
the Common Agricultural Policy appeared ir. its stead anc is clearly 
sketched out in its main principles in Mansholt’s earlier drafts 
for the Agricultural Community. This r..ust lead to a third 
conclusion; there was obviously some possible change in 
circumstance which could have made all those obstacles less 
serious, because in the 1960s circumstances had changed. The most 
likely explanation is the much greater interest in that later 
period on the part of all governments, induc’d rg that of the United 
States, in reducing barriers against imports. The Agricultural 
Community was, after all, a way of persuading countries to embark 
on a programme of trade liberalization worth the name rather than 
the very limited steps taken before 1951 in the OFF.C . Once they 
were committed to such a programme which even included tariffs an 
agricultural agreement in some form: or other would become 
necessary, not instrumental. Nor would the problems go away, 
because they were inextricably linked to the new role of the 




























































































what the deficiencies of the Mcnnet Plan ir. action eventually the 
French agricultural surpluses did emerge and Germany still remained 
the one possible market for them. All long-term economic and 
political trends pointed to the fact that a solution would have to 
be found. In an industrial world more positively committed to freer 
trade the solution became possible, although it is obvious from 
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Public Planning Targets for Agricultural Output in France, 1946-1954
(million tonnes)
Average 1950 Tar- 1950 Tar- 1951 Tar- 1952 Tar- 1957 Tar-
output get(in get(re- get(1948 get(1948 get(in












0.77 n a 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.5
tonnes)


















Sources : France, Commissariat Général au Plan, Rapport général sur le 
premier plan de modernisation (1946), pp. 163/4; ibid., Quatre ans 
d*exécution du plan de modernisation (1951), p. 194; ibid., Cinq ans 
d*exécution du plan de modernisation (1952), p. 133; ibid., Rapport sur la 
réalisation du plan de modernisation et d'équipement de l'Union Française, 
Année 1952 (1953), p. 29; ibid., Deuxième plan de modernisation et 
d'équipement. Projet de loi portant approbation (1954), p. 33. Ministère de 






























































































Actual French Net Agricultural Exports, 1948-1956 
(000 tonnes)
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
wheat 0 0 457.5 231.7 0 0 973.9 2044.9 0
wheat flour 0 0 152.5 231.3 195.2 188.1 343.2 490.2 306.2
sugar(crude) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 212.1 52.7
sugar (re- 
fined)
31.8 55.9 142.3 217.3 165.3 138.4 175.5 249.0 295.2
live cattle 
(000 head)
0 24.6 45.5 0 0 8.3 51.5 123.0 0
live pigs 
(000 head)
0 0 49.0 0 0 2.3 0 0 24.9
beef (fresh, 
chilled,frozen)
0 0 11.6 1.1 0 3.4 43.9 51.2 0
pork (fresh, 
chilled,frozen)
0 2.2 9.4 0 0 0 0 0 0.2
meat products 
(prepared)
0.5 1.8 2.4 3.3 3.0 2.9 3.4 2.8 3.6
butter 0 0 0 0 n.a. 2.2 2.8 11.9 5.5
cheese 7.0 7.2 0 8.3 1.1 8.2 8.1 10.7 7.9
condensed
milk
0 6.0 10.3 ( ) 
(12.5) 
( )
13.7 12.4 13.7 13.6 12.3
powdered 0 0 0 ( ) 0.2 0 0.1 0 0
milk
Source : FAO, Yearbook of Food and Agricultural Statistics, Commerce, 1952 
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